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“A revolutionary new phase of earth history, the Anthropocene, has 
been unleashed by human action, and the prospects for this blue sphere 
and the mass of humanity are not good. We had best start thinking 
in revolutionary terms about the forces turning the world upside 
down if we are to put brakes on the madness. A good place to begin 
is this book, whose remarkable authors bring together history and 
theory, politics and ecology, economy and culture, to force a deep look 
at the origins of global transformation. In short, the enemy to be met 
is not us, dear Pogo, but capitalism, whose unrelenting exploitation 
of (wo)man and nature is driving us all to the end(s) of the earth.”
—Richard Walker, professor emeritus of geography, University of 
California, Berkeley, and author of The Capitalist Imperative, The New 
Social Economy, The Conquest of Bread, and The Country in the City
“This volume puts the inadequate term ‘Anthropocene’ in its place and 
suggests a much more appropriate alternative. We live in the ‘age 
of capital,’ the Capitalocene, the contributors argue, and the urgent, 
frightening and hopeful consequences of this reality check become 
apparent in chapters that forces the reader to think. In a time when 
there is generally no time or space to think (meaning: to go beyond 
the thoughtlessness that is the hallmark of ‘business as usual’) we 
need a book like this more than ever. Confronting and thinking 
the Capitalocene we must. This book is a great place to start.”
—Bram Büscher, professor of sociology, Wageningen University, 
and author of Transforming the Frontier: Peace Parks and the 
Politics of Neoliberal Conservation in Southern Africa.
“For more than a decade, earth system scientists have espoused 
the idea of a new geological age, the Anthropocene, as a means of 
understand the system environmental changes to our planet in 
recent decades. Yet we cannot tackle the problem of climate change 
without a full account of its historical roots. In this pioneering 
volume, leading critics call for a diferent conceptual framework, 
which places global change in a new, ecologically oriented history 
of capitalism—the Capitalocene. No scholar or activist interested in 
the debate about the Anthropocene will want to miss this volume.”
—Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, associate professor of history, 
University of Chicago, and author of Enlightenment’s Frontier: 
The Scottish Highlands and the Origins of Environmentalism
“Attempts to build political alliances around the project of rebalancing 
relations between ‘society’ and ‘nature’ have always stumbled when 
they encounter the thousands of communities and groups that would 
prefer not to have much truck with this dualism at all. The idea that 
global warming is a matter of the advent of an ‘anthropocene era’ is 
getting to be a particular obstacle to efective climate action—one that 
this book provides brilliant new intellectual tools for overcoming.”
—Larry Lohmann, The Corner House
Anthropocene or Capitalocene?
In ancient Greek philosophy, kairos signiies the right time or the “moment 
of transition.” We believe that we live in such a transitional period. The 
most important task of social science in time of transformation is to trans-
form itself into a force of liberation. Kairos, an editorial imprint of the 
Anthropology and Social Change department housed in the California 
Institute of Integral Studies, publishes groundbreaking works in critical 
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education, political ecology, political theory, and history.
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It was a spring day in southern Sweden in 2009. I was talking with Andreas 
Malm, then a PhD student at Lund University. “Forget the Anthropocene,” 
he said. “We should call it the Capitalocene!”
At the time, I didn’t pay much attention to it. “Yes, of course,” I thought. 
But I didn’t have a sense of what the Capitalocene might mean, beyond a 
reasonable—but not particularly interesting—claim that capitalism is the 
pivot of today’s biospheric crisis.
This was also a time when I began to rethink much of environmental 
studies’ conventional wisdom. This conventional wisdom had become 
atmospheric. It said, in efect, that the job of environmental studies schol-
ars is to study “the” environment, and therefore to study the environmen-
tal context, conditions, and consequences of social relations. The social 
relations themselves—not least, but not only, those of political economy—
were generally outside the ield’s core concerns. That didn’t seem right to 
me. Weren’t all those “social relations” already bundled within the web of 
life? Were not world trade, imperialism, class structure, gender relations, 
racial orders—and much more—not just producers of environmental 
changes but also products of the web of life? At some high level of abstrac-
tion, that argument was widely accepted. But at a practical, analytical level, 
such ideas were exceedingly marginal.
That has now changed. The idea of the Capitalocene as a multispecies 
assemblage, a world-ecology of capital, power, and nature, is part of the 
global conversation—for scholars, but also for a growing layer of activists.
This book is one product of the conversations that germinated in 
Sweden, beginning that spring of 2009. Those conversations would 
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eventually give rise to the world-ecology perspective, in which the rela-
tions of capital, power, and nature form an evolving, uneven, and pat-
terned whole in the modern world. Rather than pursue a “theory of every-
thing,” the early world-ecology conversation began with special group of 
graduate students at Lund University interested in pushing the bounda-
ries of how we think space, geography, and nature in capitalism. These stu-
dents included: Diana C. Gildea, Erik Jonsson, Cheryl Sjöström, Holly Jean 
Buck, Bruno Portillo, Geannine Chabaneix, Jenica Frisque, Xiao Yu, and 
Jessica C. Marx. Holly Buck deserves special credit for insisting that the 
Anthropocene, for all its many problems, remained a useful way of speak-
ing to a wider audience. This is what we call a productive disagreement!
Special thanks go to a number of individuals. First, special thanks to 
my colleagues at Binghamton University: to Bat-Ami Bar On, the director 
of the university’s Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, and 
to Donald G. Nieman, provost, for allowing me release time from teaching 
to complete this book. Thanks also to Denis O’Hearn, my department chair, 
for providing a congenial atmosphere to complete this project. I would 
also like to thank the many generous scholars around the world who have 
invited me for talks, and the audiences who sat patiently through those 
talks—your responses and conversations have enriched the present dia-
logue in ways that are oten not so obvious, but no less profound for it.
The arguments you ind in this book owe everything to a wonder-
ful community of radical intellectuals who encouraged, in large ways 
and small, the Anthropocene/Capitalocene and world-ecology conversa-
tions: Haroon Akram-Lodhi, Elmar Altvater, Gennaro Avallone, Henry 
Bernstein, Jay Bolthouse, Neil Brenner, Alvin Camba, Christopher Cox, 
Sharae Deckard, Marion Dixon, Joshua Eichen, Harriet Friedmann, Paul 
K. Gellert, Aaron Jakes, Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, Ashok Kumbamu, 
Benjamin Kunkel, Rebecca Lave, Emanuele Leonardi, Kirk Lawrence, 
Sasha Lilley, Larry Lohmann, Philip McMichael, Michael Niblett, Kerstin 
Olof, Andrew Pragacz, Larry Reynolds, Marcus Taylor, Eric Vanhaute, 
Tony Weis, and Anna Zalik. I am especially grateful for continuing con-
versations with Diana C. Gildea, Christian Parenti, Raj Patel, and Marge 
Thomas. Ramsey Kanaan and the team at PM Press were exemplary and 
encouraging at every step. Naomi Schulz compiled and helped to format 
the bibliography. And inally, I am inspired by and grateful for Diana’s and 
Malcolm’s unlinching joy and love in making life—and in transforming 
the world as we know it.
1INTRODUCTION
Anthropocene or Capitalocene?
Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism
Jason W. Moore
The news is not good on planet Earth. Humanity—and the rest of life with 
it—is now on the threshold of what earth system scientists call a “state shit.” 
This moment is dramatized in the growing awareness of climate change—
among scholars, and also among a wider concerned public. But our moment 
involves far more than bad climate. We are living through a transition in 
planetary life with the “potential to transform Earth rapidly and irrevers-
ibly into a state unknown in human experience” (Barnosky et al. 2012, 52).
The zeitgeist of the twenty-irst century is therefore understandably 
infused with a sense of urgency, among citizens, activists, and scholars 
(e.g., Foster et al. 2010; Hansen 2009; Parenti 2011; Klein 2014). The reality 
is quite real. And, in any reasonable evaluation, the situation is deterio-
rating. Weekly, even daily, the research mounts. “Human pressures” are 
pushing the conditions of biospheric stability—climate and biodiversity 
above all—to the breaking point (Stefen et al. 2015; Mace et al. 2014; Dirzo 
et al. 2014). Multiple “planetary boundaries” are now being crossed—or 
soon will be (Rockström et al. 2009). The conditions of life on planet Earth 
are changing, rapidly and fundamentally.
Awareness of this diicult situation has been building for some time. 
But the reality of a crisis—understood as a fundamental turning point in 
the life of a system, any system—is oten diicult to understand, interpret, 
and act upon. Crises are not easily understood by those who live through 
them. The philosophies, concepts, and stories we use to make sense of an 
increasingly explosive and uncertain global present are—nearly always—
ideas inherited from a diferent time and place. The kind of thinking that 
created today’s global turbulence is unlikely to help us solve it.1
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Modes of thought are tenacious. They are no easier to transcend 
than the “modes of production” they relect and help to shape. This col-
lection of essays is one efort to extend and nurture a global conversa-
tion over such a new mode of thought. Our point of departure is the 
Anthropocene concept, the most inluential concept in environmental 
studies over the past decade. The essays in this book ofer distinctive 
critiques of the Anthropocene argument—which is in fact a family of 
arguments with many variations. But the intention is to move beyond 
critique. The Anthropocene is a worthy point of departure not only for 
its popularity but, more importantly, because it poses questions that are 
fundamental to our times: How do humans it within the web of life? How 
have various human organizations and processes—states and empires, 
world markets, urbanization, and much beyond—reshaped planetary life? 
The Anthropocene perspective is rightly powerful and inluential for 
bringing these questions into the academic mainstream—and even (but 
unevenly) into popular awareness.
The work of this book is to encourage a debate—and to nurture a per-
spective—that moves beyond Green Arithmetic: the idea that our histories 
may be considered and narrated by adding up Humanity (or Society) and 
Nature, or even Capitalism plus Nature. For such dualisms are part of 
the problem—they are fundamental to the thinking that has brought the 
biosphere to its present transition toward a less habitable world. It is still 
only dimly realized that the categories of “Society” and “Nature”—Society 
without nature, Nature without humans—are part of the problem, intel-
lectually and politically. No less than the binaries of Eurocentrism, racism, 
and sexism, Nature/Society is directly implicated in the modern world’s 
colossal violence, inequality, and oppression. This argument against 
dualism implicates something abstract—Nature/Society—but neverthe-
less quite material. For the abstraction Nature/Society historically con-
forms to a seemingly endless series of human exclusions—never mind 
the rationalizing disciplines and exterminist policies imposed upon extra-
human natures. These exclusions correspond to a long history of subordi-
nating women, colonial populations, and peoples of color—humans rarely 
accorded membership in Adam Smith’s “civilized society” ([1776] 1937).
These are certainly questions of oppression. And they are also funda-
mental to capitalism’s political economy, which rests upon an audacious 
accumulation strategy: Cheap Nature. For capitalism, Nature is “cheap” 
in a double sense: to make Nature’s elements “cheap” in price; and also to 
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cheapen, to degrade or to render inferior in an ethico-political sense, the 
better to make Nature cheap in price. These two moments are entwined 
at every moment, and in every major capitalist transformation of the past 
ive centuries (Moore 2015a).
This matters for our analytics, and also for our politics. Eforts to 
transcend capitalism in any egalitarian and broadly sustainable fashion 
will be stymied so long as the radical political imagination is captive to 
capitalism’s either/or organization of reality: Nature/Society. And relat-
edly, eforts to discern capitalism’s limits today—such discernment is 
crucial to any antisystemic strategy—cannot advance much further by 
encasing reality in dualisms that are immanent to capitalist development.
The Anthropocene argument shows Nature/Society dualism at its 
highest stage of development. And if the Anthropocene—as a historical 
rather than geological argument—is inadequate, it is nevertheless an 
argument that merits our appreciation. New thinking emerges in many 
tentative steps. There are many conceptual halfway houses en route to a 
new synthesis. The Anthropocene concept is surely the most inluential 
of these halfway houses. No concept grounded in historical change has 
been so inluential across the spectrum of Green Thought; no other socio-
ecological concept has so gripped popular attention.
Formulated by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer in 2000, the 
Anthropocene concept proceeds from an eminently reasonable position: 
the biosphere and geological time has been fundamentally transformed 
by human activity. A new conceptualization of geological time—one that 
includes “mankind” as a “major geological force”—is necessary. This was 
a surely a courageous proposal. For to propose humanity as a geological 
agent is to transgress one of modernity’s fundamental intellectual bounda-
ries. Scholars call this the “Two Cultures,” of the “natural” and “human” sci-
ences (Snow 1957). At its best, the Anthropocene concept entwines human 
history and natural history—even if the “why” and the “how” remain 
unclear, and hotly debated. Such murkiness surely accounts for the con-
cept’s popularity. Like globalization in the 1990s, the Anthropocene has 
become a buzzword that can mean all things to all people. Nevertheless, 
reinforced by earlier developments in environmental history (e.g., 
Worster 1988), the Anthropocene as an argument has gradually crystal-
lized: “Human action” plus “Nature” equals “planetary crisis” (Chakrabarty 
2009; e.g., Stefen et al. 2007). Green Arithmetic, formulating history as the 
aggregation of human and natural relations, had triumphed.
A n t h r o p o c e n e  o r  c A p i tA l o c e n e ?
4
Green Arithmetic. It is a curious term, but I can think none better to 
describe the basic procedure of environmental studies over the past few 
decades: Society plus Nature = History. Today it is Humanity, or Society, 
or Capitalism plus Nature = Catastrophe. I do not wish to disparage this 
model. It has been a powerful one. It has provided the philosophical basis 
for studies that have delivered a wealth of knowledge about environmen-
tal change. These studies, in turn, have allowed a deeper understanding 
of the what of the biosphere’s unfolding “state shit.” But they have not 
facilitated—indeed they have stymied—our understanding of how the 
present crisis will unfold in a world-system that is a world-ecology, joining 
power, nature, and accumulation in a dialectical and unstable unity.2 This 
book seeks to transcend the limits of Green Arithmetic. This allows us to 
pursue, in Donna Haraway’s words, “wonderful, messy tales” of multi-
species history—tales that point to the possibilities “for getting on now, 
as well as in deep earth history” (see her “Staying with the Trouble” in 
this volume).
Green Arithmetic works when we assume Society plus Nature add up. 
But do they? In my view, this “adding up” was necessary—and for a long 
time very productive. The consolidation of the historical social sciences 
in the century ater 1870s proceeded as if nature did not exist. There were 
some exceptions (e.g., Mumford 1934), but none that unsettled the status 
quo until the 1970s. Then, energized by the “new” social movements—not 
least around race, gender, and environment—we saw an important intel-
lectual revolt. The blank spots in the dominant cognitive mapping of 
reality were illed in; the old, nature-blind, cognitive map was challenged. 
In environmental studies, radicals argued for a relational view of human-
ity-in-nature, and nature-in-humanity (e.g., Harvey 1974; Naess 1973). But 
that relational critique remained, for the most part, philosophical. Above 
all, our concepts of “big history”—imperialism, capitalism, industrializa-
tion, commercialization, patriarchy, racial formations—remained social 
processes. Environmental consequences were added on, but the concep-
tion of history as social history did not fundamentally change.
Today a new conceptual wind blows. It seems we are now ready to 
ask, and even to begin to answer, a big question about big history: What 
if these world-historical processes are not only producers, but also prod-
ucts of changes in the web of life? The question turns inside out a whole 
series of premises that have become staples of Green Thought. Two are 
especially salient. First, we are led to ask questions not about humanity’s 
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separation from nature, but about how humans—and human organiza-
tions (e.g., empires, world markets)—it within the web of life, and vice 
versa. This allows us to begin posing situated questions, in Donna 
Haraway’s sense (1988). We start to see human organization as something 
more-than-human and less-than-social. We begin to see human organiza-
tion as utterly, completely, and variably porous within the web of life. 
Second, we can begin asking questions about something possibly more 
signiicant than the “degradation” of nature. There is no doubt that capital-
ism imposes a relentless pattern of violence on nature, humans included. 
But capitalism works because violence is part of a larger repertoire of 
strategies that “put nature to work.” Thus, our question incorporates but 
moves beyond the degradation of nature thesis: How does modernity put 
nature to work? How do speciic combinations of human and extra-human 
activity work—or limit—the endless accumulation of capital? Such ques-
tions—these are far from the only ones!—point toward a new thinking 
about humanity in the web of life.
Anthropocene or Capitalocene? An Evolving Conversation
The chapters in this volume defy easy summary. But two common themes 
emerge. First, the essays all suggest that the Anthropocene argument 
poses questions that it cannot answer. The Anthropocene sounds the 
alarm—and what an alarm it is! But it cannot explain how these alarming 
changes came about. Questions of capitalism, power and class, anthropo-
centrism, dualist framings of “nature” and “society,” and the role of states 
and empires—all are frequently bracketed by the dominant Anthropocene 
perspective. Second, the contributors to Anthropocene or Capitalocene? all 
seek to go beyond critique. All argue for reconstructions that point to a 
new way of thinking humanity-in-nature, and nature-in-humanity.
The irst thing I wish to say is that Capitalocene is an ugly word for an 
ugly system. As Haraway points out, “the Capitalocene” seems to be one 
of those words loating in the ether, one crystallized by several scholars 
at once—many of them independently. I irst heard the word in 2009 from 
Andreas Malm. The radical economist David Ruccio seems to have irst 
publicized the concept, on his blog in 2011 (Ruccio 2011). By 2012, Haraway 
began to use the concept in her public lectures (Haraway 2015). That same 
year, Tony Weis and I were discussing the concept in relation to what 
would become The Ecological Hoofprint, his groundbreaking work on the 
meat-industrial complex (2013). My formulation of the Capitalocene took 
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shape in the early months of 2013, as my discontent with the Anthropocene 
argument began to grow.
The Capitalocene. As I think the contributions to this volume clarify, 
the Capitalocene does not stand for capitalism as an economic and 
social system. It is not a radical inlection of Green Arithmetic. Rather, 
the Capitalocene signiies capitalism as a way of organizing nature—as 
a multispecies, situated, capitalist world-ecology. I will try to use the 
word sparingly. There have been many other wordplays—Anthrobscene 
(Parikka 2014), econocene (Norgaard 2013), technocene (Hornborg 2015), 
misanthropocene (Patel 2013), and perhaps most delightfully, manthropo-
cene (Raworth 2014). All are useful. But none captures the basic historical 
pattern modern of world history as the “Age of Capital”—and the era of 
capitalism as a world-ecology of power, capital, and nature.
In Part I, Eileen Crist and Donna J. Haraway take apart the 
Anthropocene concept and point to the possibilities for an alternative. 
Crist cautions powerfully against the Anthropocene argument—and 
other “Promethean self-portrait[s].” These tend to reinvent, and at time 
subtly recuperate, neo-Malthusian thought. While many defenders of 
the Anthropocene concept point to the ways it has opened discussion, 
Crist sees this opening as exceedingly selective. For Crist, the concept 
“shrinks the discursive space of challenging the [human] domination of 
the biosphere, ofering instead a techno-scientiic pitch for its rationaliza-
tion.” Drawing on Thomas Berry, Crist orients us toward a diferent—and 
more hopeful—framing of our present and possible futures. This would 
be not an “age of Man” but an “ecozoic”: a vision of humanity-in-nature as 
a “union-in-diversity,” in which humanity may embrace “Earth’s integral 
living community.”
Donna J. Haraway elaborates the spirit of Crist’s “ecozoic” perspec-
tive, taking it—as she so oten does—toward a new vision: the Chthulucene. 
Here the autopoietic, closed system mirage of capital (or “society”) is 
revealed as partial and illusory. Such closed system thinking cannot help 
us to think through the liberatory possibilities of a messy, muddled, inter-
species future. This Chthulucene—admittedly a word that does not roll 
easily of the tongue—is not autopoietic but sympoietic: “always part-
nered all the way down, with no starting and subsequently interacting 
‘units.’” For Haraway, the problem of the Anthropocene is fundamentally 
a problem of thinking humanity’s place in the web of life: “It matters what 
thoughts think thoughts.” But, Haraway argues forcefully, even poetically, 
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the issue is not “merely” thinking, it is how thought and messy life-making 
unfold in ways that are “always partnered.” The Anthropocene, then, is not 
only poor thinking—a narrative of “the self-making Human, the human-
making machine of history.” It is also poor history: “Coal and the steam 
engine did not determine the story, and besides the dates are all wrong, 
not because one has to go back to the last ice age, but because one has to 
at least include the great market and commodity reworldings of the long 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the current era, even if we think 
(wrongly) that we can remain Euro-centered in thinking about ‘globaliz-
ing’ transformations shaping the Capitalocene.”
The historical geography of the Capitalocene moves to center stage 
in Part II. In “The Rise of Cheap Nature,” I argue for an interpretive frame 
for capitalism’s history that builds on Haraway’s longstanding critique of 
“human exceptionalism” (2008). Capitalism is a way of organizing nature 
as a whole . . . a nature in which human organizations (classes, empires, 
markets, etc.) not only make environments, but are simultaneously 
made by the historical lux and low of the web of life. In this perspective, 
capitalism is a world-ecology that joins the accumulation of capital, the 
pursuit of power, and the co-production of nature in successive histori-
cal conigurations. I show that the emphasis on the Industrial Revolution 
as the origin of modernity lows from a historical method that privileges 
environmental consequences and occludes the geographies of capital and 
power. Green Thought’s love afair with the Industrial Revolution has 
undermined eforts to locate the origins of today’s crises in the epoch-
making transformations of capital, power, and nature that began in the 
“long” sixteenth century (Braudel 1953). The origins of today’s inseparable 
but distinct crises of capital accumulation and biospheric stability are 
found in a series of landscape, class, territorial, and technical transforma-
tions that emerged in the three centuries ater 1450.
Justin McBrien agrees that we are living in the Capitalocene, high-
lighting capitalism’s drive toward extinction in a world-ecological sense. 
Extinction, McBrien argues, is more than a biological process sufered 
by other species. It signiies also the “extinguishing of cultures and lan-
guages,” genocide, and spectrum of biospheric changes understood as 
anthropogenic. McBrien demonstrates that the very conception of these 
changes as anthropogenic is premised on the systematic conceptual 
exclusion of capitalism. These conceptions are, in McBrien’s narrative, a 
product of modern science, at once opposing and entwined within webs 
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of imperial power and capital accumulation. Far from merely an output 
of the system—as in Green Arithmetic—he shows that “accumulation 
by extinction” has been fundamental to capitalism from the beginning. 
The Capitalocene, in this view, is also a Necrocene: “The accumulation of 
capital is the accumulation of potential extinction—a potential increas-
ingly activated in recent decades.” Far from embracing planetary cata-
strophism and the apocalyptic vistas of many environmentalists, McBrien 
shows how catastrophism itself has been a form of knowledge situated 
within the successive ecological regimes of postwar and neoliberal cap-
italism. Catastrophism, in this reading, has rendered both poles of the 
environmentalist binary—“sustainability or collapse?” (Costanza et al. 
2007)—mirror images of each other.
Elmer Altvater moves beyond political economy to include Weber’s 
“European rationality of world domination” and to challenge the core 
assumptions of modern rationality. On the one hand, Altvater sees the 
origins of capitalism in the “long” sixteenth century and the invention 
of Cheap Nature. On the other hand, he sees a decisive shit in the transi-
tion from the “formal” to the “real” subsumption of labor by capital in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Altvater calls these two 
periodizations the “Braudel” and the “Polanyi” hypotheses—ater Fernand 
Braudel and Karl Polanyi. Far from competing, these periodizations are 
best seen in the totality of historical capitalism: both positions, Braudel 
and Polanyi’s, are correct. Importantly, for Altvater, the Capitalocene is 
not only a question of capital accumulation but of rationalization—imma-
nent to the accumulation process. Charting the contradictions between 
the irm-level calculation of costs—and the microeconomic “rationality” of 
externalization—he illuminates a broader set of problems within capital-
ist modernity and its capacity to address climate change. Using geoengi-
neering as an optic, Altvater pinpoints the trap of bourgeois rationality 
in relation to biospheric change today. The geoengineers’
task is much greater than building a car or a dam or a hotel; the 
geoengineers are tasked with controlling whole earth systems in 
order to combat—or at least to reduce—the negative consequences 
of capitalist externalization. However, the required internalization 
of externalized emissions is the internalization of external efects 
into production costs at the level of the corporation. Then indeed—
in principle—the prices could “tell the truth,” as in the neoclassical 
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textbooks. But we would not be wiser still. Why? Because many 
interdependencies in society and nature cannot be expressed in terms 
of prices. Any efective rationalization would have to be holistic; it 
would have to be qualitative and consider much more than price 
alone. But that is impossible because it contradicts capitalist ration-
ality, which is committed to ixing the parts and not the whole. In 
such a scenario, capitalist modernization through externalization 
would—inevitably—come to an end. The Four Cheaps would disap-
pear behind the “event horizon.” Would it be possible for geoengi-
neers to bring the necessary moderation of modernization and of 
capitalist dynamics in coincidence? They cannot, for the engineers 
are not qualiied to work holistically.
In Part III, questions of culture and politics in the Capitalocene move 
to center stage. In Chapter Six, Daniel Hartley asks how culture matters 
to thinking about the Anthropocene and Capitalocene. Drawing on the 
world-ecology perspective, he suggests that the concepts “abstract social 
nature” (Moore 2014b, 2015a) and “cultural ix” (Shapiro 2014) provide 
rough—yet partial—guides to the history of capitalism in the web of life. 
Warning of the dangers that might separate “science” and “culture” in 
capitalist environment-making, Hartley points to the relations between 
science and culture, capital and nature, as fundamental to the historical 
geographies of endless accumulation. In this formulation, he argues pow-
erfully for the analytical incorporation of those relations—racism, sexism, 
and other “cultural” forms—that “appear to have no immediate relation 
to ecology, but which are in fact” fundamental to humanity’s diverse rela-
tions within the web of life.”
Christian Parenti, in the concluding chapter, takes us from culture to 
the politics of the Capitalocene. Parenti’s innovation is twofold. First, he 
reconstructs the modern state as fundamentally an environment-mak-
ing process. The modern state is not only a producer of environmental 
changes. In equal measure, state power, as Parenti shows in his explora-
tion of early American history, develops through environmental transfor-
mation. Secondly, the modern state works through a peculiar valuation of 
nature—what Marx calls value as abstract social labor. Parenti’s insight is 
that power, value, and nature are thinkable only in relation to each other. 
Thus, the modern state “is at the heart of the value form.” Why? “Because 
“the use values of nonhuman nature are . . . central sources of value, and 
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it is the state that delivers these.” Far from operating outside or above 
“nature,” in Parenti’s account the state becomes the pivotal organizational 
nexus of the relation between modern territory, nature as tap and sink, 
and capital accumulation. The political implications of this analysis are 
crucial. The state is not only analytically central to the making of the capi-
talist world-ecology, but is the only institution large enough and powerful 
enough to allow for a progressive response to the escalating challenges 
of climate change.
Toward the Chtulucene . . . (and/or) a Socialist World-Ecology?
Relecting a diversity of perspectives around a common theme—how the 
modern world has organized human and extra-human natures—the book’s 
essays are joyfully varied. They point toward a new synthesis, even a new 
paradigm. I have called this paradigm world-ecology, although we may yet 
ind a better phrase for it. This new thinking—whatever name we give it—
relects (and shapes?) a certain zeitgeist. The notion that humans are a part 
of nature, that the whole of nature makes us, is one readily accepted by a 
growing layer of the world’s populations. University students and many 
activists seem especially receptive; but this zeitgeist reaches well beyond. 
It is revealed dramatically in many of our era’s emergent movements—
food sovereignty, climate justice, “right to the city,” degrowth, and many 
others. These movements represent a “new ontological politics” (Moore 
2015b). All organize not only for a more equitable distribution of wealth: 
they call for a new conception of wealth, in which equity and sustainability 
in the reproduction of life (of all life) is central to our vision of the future. 
In these movements, we ind hope for the realization of Haraway’s sym-
poietic vision: the Chthulucene.
Whatever name we attach to it, the sympoietic vision shares a new 
ontology that meshes with—and learns from—movements around food sov-
ereignty and climate justice (see e.g., Wittman et al. 2011; McMichael 2013; 
Bond 2012). The new ontological politics is so hopeful—without waxing 
romantic—because it ofers not merely a distributional, but an ontological, 
vision. That vision questions the whole model of how capitalism values 
nature, and humans within it. For food and climate justice movements—of 
course there are important variations—the questions of equality, sustain-
able, and democracy are thinkable only through and in relation to each 
other. They have made, as never before, food, climate, and the web of life 
fundamental to older radical vistas of equality among humans.
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Importantly, these movements’ relational vision of humanity-in-
nature occurs at a time when the capitalist model is showing signs of 
exhaustion. If it has been nothing else, capitalism has been a system of 
getting nature—human nature too!—to work for free or very low-cost. 
Capitalism’s “law” of value—how and what it prioritizes in the web of life—
has always been a law of Cheap Nature. (Absurd, yes! For nature is never 
cheap.) The weird and dynamic process of putting nature to work on the 
cheap has been the basis for modernity’s accomplishments—its hunger 
for, and it capacity to extract the Four Cheaps: food, energy, raw materi-
als, and human life. These capacities are now wearing thin. Industrial 
agricultural productivity has stalled since the mid-1980s. So has labor pro-
ductivity in industry—since the 1970s. The contradictions of capitalism 
dramatized by biospheric instability reveal modernity’s accomplishment 
as premised on an active and ongoing thet: of our times, of planetary life, 
of our—and our children’s—futures (Moore 2015a).
The breakdown of capitalism today is—and at the same time is not—
the old story of crisis and the end of capitalism. As capital progressively 
internalizes the costs of climate change, massive biodiversity loss, toxiica-
tion, epidemic disease, and many other biophysical costs, new movements 
are gaining strength. These are challenging not only capitalism’s unequal 
distribution—pay the “ecological debt”!—but the very way we think about 
what is being distributed. The exhaustion of capitalism’s valuation of 
reality is simultaneously internal to capital and giving rise to the new onto-
logical politics outside that value system—and in direct to response to its 
breakdown. We see as never before the lowering of an ontological imagi-
nation beyond Cartesian dualism, one that carries forth the possibility of 
alternative valuations of food, climate, nature, and everything else. They 
are revealing capitalism’s law of value as the value of nothing—or at any 
rate, of nothing particularly valuable (Patel 2009). And they point toward 
a world-ecology in which power, wealth, and re/production are forged in 
conversation with needs of the web of life, and humanity’s place within it.
Notes
1 A phrase, or some variant, frequently attributed to Albert Einstein.
2 Key texts in world-ecology include Moore 2015a; Bolthouse 2014; Büscher 
and Fletcher 2015; Camba 2015; Campbell and Niblett 2016; Cox 2015; Deckard 
2015; Dixon 2015; El-Khoury 2015; Gill 2015; Jakes forthcoming; Kröger 2015; 
Lohmann 2016; Marley 2015; Niblett 2013; Olof 2012; Ortiz 2014; Parenti 2014; 
Weis 2013.
